Top: Society: Philosophy: Mind: Consciousness


[ history ]

Overview: Mind and Consciousness

The problem of consciousness has seen a surge of interest in the last several decades. Put simply, it is the problem of explaining the phenomena of experience by reference to physical properties. How does one begin to explain the phenomenal quality of experiencing red by reference to anything physical? Consciousness seems to be "out of place" in the physical world.

There have been several approaches to the problem of consciousness. The first approach is to deny that a problem really exists. This position is exemplified to varying degrees by Daniel Dennett and Fred Dretske. The second approach is to acknowledge that there is an illusion of a problem of consciousness, but that the illusion is explained away by an epistemic gap in our introspection. This position is exemplified by Michael Tye and other representationalists. The third approach is to acknowledge that a problem really exists. Some, like David Chalmers, think that the problem warrants our rejection of materialism in favor of some expanded naturalistic ontology. Others, like Colin McGinn think that we are forever epistemologically closed to the problem because of limits to our cognitive abilities.


[ history ]

History: Mind, Consciousness, the Unconscious

In connection with the investigation of our mental operations there arises the question, whether these are to be deemed coextensive with consciousness. Are there unconscious mental processes?
The problem under different forms has occupied the attention of philosophers from Leibniz to J. S. Mill, while the phenomena of hypnotism, "multiple personality", and abnormal forms of mental life have brought the question of the relation between the unconscious and the conscious processes in the human organism into greater prominence. That all forms of mental life, perception, thought, feeling, and volition are profoundly affected in character by nervous processes and by vital activities, which do not emerge into the strata of conscious life, seems to be indisputably established. Whether however, unconscious processes which affect conclusions of the intellect and resolutions of the will, but are in themselves quite unconscious, should be called mental states, or conceived as acts of the mind, has been keenly disputed. In favour of the doctrine of unconscious mental processes have been urged the fact that many of our ordinary sensations arise out of an aggregate of impressions individually too faint to be separately perceivable, the fact that attention may reveal to us experiences previously unnoticed, the fact that unobserved trains of thought may result in sudden reminiscences, and that in abnormal mental conditions hypnotized, somnambulistic, and hysterical patients often accomplish difficult intellectual feats whilst remaining utterly unaware of the rational intermediate steps leading up to the final results. On the other side it is urged that most of those phenomena can be accounted for by merely subconscious processes which escape attention and are forgotten; or, at all events, by unconscious cerebration, the working out of purely physical nervous processes without any concomitant mental state till the final cerebral situation is reached, when the corresponding mental act is evoked. The dispute is probably, at least in part, grounded on differences of definition. Still whatever terminology we may find it convenient to adopt, the fact remains, that our most purely intellectual operations are profoundly influenced by changes which take place below the surface of consciousness.

Editor: Haselhurst


[ history ]

based

1. Catholic Encyclopedia: Mind, 1911



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